
by Philip J. Neujahr
Other works on Kant and on his Critical Philosophy attempt either to remove Kant's transcendental idealism from his system or to defend it as being essential to the Kantian enterprise. In Kant's Idealism, Professor Neujahr argues - he may be the first to do so - that there is no single doctrine that is Kant's transcendental idealism to either explain or explain away. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claims to present a distinctive form of idealism he calls "transcendental" idealism and that he contrasts with the "empirical" idealism of his predecessors. Professor Neujahr argues that on the contrary there is no single form of idealism in Kant's system and no simple contrast between Kant's transcendental idealism and the idealist doctrines of his philosophical forebears. Neujahr finds (and clearly delineates) "strands of idealism" in Kant's philosophy. He argues that the source of these various forms of idealism is the conflicting demands of Kant's theories of perception (sensibility

Umberto Eco

Paul Redding
Indie authors send us advance copies. We match them to readers by genre. You get the book free, the author gets an honest review.



